Hanrui Zhang

25 papers · 2019–2024 · 3 conferences · across top CS/AI conferences

Achievements

🐝 Cross-Pollinator (9) 🏃 Academic Marathon (5) 🌈 Renaissance Researcher (5) 🌉 Interdisciplinary Bridge 🗺️ Taxonomy Completionist (37) 🧭 Keyword Pioneer 🐣 Hot Topic Early Bird 🌍 Conference Polyglot (3) 🤝 Dynamic Duo (16) 🏆 Keyword Champion (5) ⚡ Prolific Year (6) 🚀 Conference Pioneer 💎 Century Club (25) 🗃️ Keyword Collector (107)

Conferences

NIPS (11) AAAI (10) ICML (4)

Top co-authors

Vincent Conitzer (16) Yu Cheng (7) Yuan Deng (4) Vahab Mirrokni (3) Ruosong Wang (2) Jieming Mao (2) Kunhe Yang (2) Song Zuo (2) Debmalya Panigrahi (2) Yixuan Even Xu (2)

Research topics

Discrete Mathematics (1)

Keywords

mechanism design (8) strategic classification (5) sample complexity (4) pac learning (4) incentive compatibility (3) principal-agent model (3) automated mechanism design (2) judgment aggregation (2) prior-independent mechanism (2) truthful mechanism (2) auction theory (2) approximation algorithm (2) strategic manipulation (2) first-price auction (2) optimal policy (2) social choice (2) regret bound (2) preference aggregation (2) price of anarchy (2) policy learning (1)

Papers

Aggregating Quantitative Relative Judgments: From Social Choice to Ranking Prediction NIPS 2024

Strategic Littlestone Dimension: Improved Bounds on Online Strategic Classification NIPS 2024

Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups AAAI 2024

Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World NIPS 2024

Computational Aspects of Bayesian Persuasion under Approximate Best Response NIPS 2024

Autobidder's Dilemma: Why More Sophisticated Autobidders Lead to Worse Auction Efficiency NIPS 2024

Planning with Participation Constraints AAAI 2022

Posted Pricing and Dynamic Prior-independent Mechanisms with Value Maximizers NIPS 2022

Learning Influence Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks AAAI 2022

Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification AAAI 2021

Incentive-Aware PAC Learning AAAI 2021

Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection AAAI 2021

Prior-independent Dynamic Auctions for a Value-maximizing Buyer NIPS 2021

Automated Dynamic Mechanism Design NIPS 2021

Classification with Strategically Withheld Data AAAI 2021

Learning the Valuations of a $k$-demand Agent ICML 2020

Learning Opinions in Social Networks ICML 2020

Mitigating Manipulation in Peer Review via Randomized Reviewer Assignments NIPS 2020

Nearly Linear Row Sampling Algorithm for Quantile Regression ICML 2020

A PAC Framework for Aggregating Agents’ Judgments AAAI 2019

Distinguishing Distributions When Samples Are Strategically Transformed NIPS 2019

A Better Algorithm for Societal Tradeoffs AAAI 2019

Provably Efficient Q-learning with Function Approximation via Distribution Shift Error Checking Oracle NIPS 2019

Learning Set Functions with Limited Complementarity AAAI 2019

When Samples Are Strategically Selected ICML 2019