2024 AISTATS AISTATS 2024

Near-Optimal Pure Exploration in Matrix Games: A Generalization of Stochastic Bandits & Dueling Bandits

Abstract

We study the sample complexity of identifying the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in a two-player zero-sum matrix game with noise. Formally, we are given a stochastic model where any learner can sample an entry $(i,j)$ of the input matrix $A\in [-1,1]^{n\times m}$ and observe $A_{i,j}+\eta$ where $\eta$ is a zero-mean $1$-sub-Gaussian noise. The aim of the learner is to identify the PSNE of $A$, whenever it exists, with high probability while taking as few samples as possible. Zhou et al., (2017) presents an instance-dependent sample complexity lower bound that depends only on the entries in the row and column in which the PSNE lies. We design a near-optimal algorithm whose sample complexity matches the lower bound, up to log factors. The problem of identifying the PSNE also generalizes the problem of pure exploration in stochastic multi-armed bandits and dueling bandits, and our result matches the optimal bounds, up to log factors, in both the settings.

🌉 Interdisciplinary Bridge — Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
🐝 Cross-Pollinator — Artificial Intelligence, Computer Science, Data Science & Analytics, Deep Learning, Interdisciplinary, Machine Learning, Mathematics & Optimization, Natural Language Processing, Reinforcement Learning, Robotics
🧭 Keyword Pioneer — pure strategy nash equilibrium