Fair and Efficient Balanced Allocation for Indivisible Goods

Abstract We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the balanced constraint). While this constraint is common in real-world scenarios such as team drafts or asset division, it significantly complicates the search for allocations that are both fair and efficient. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-established fairness notion for indivisible goods. Pareto optimality (PO) and its stronger variant, fractional Pareto optimality (fPO), are widely accepted efficiency criteria. Our main contribution establishes both the existence and polynomial-time computability of allocations that are simultaneously EF1 and fPO under balanced constraints in two fundamental cases: (1) when agents have at most two distinct types of valuation functions, and (2) when each agent has a personalized bivalued valuation. Our algorithms leverage novel applications of maximum-weight matching in bipartite graphs and duality theory, providing the first polynomial-time solutions for these cases and offering new insights for constrained fair division problems.